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Abstract
We consider the age-old problem of allocating items among different agents in a way
that is efficient and fair. Two papers, by Dolev et al. and Ghodsi et al., have recently studied
this problem in the context of computer systems. Both papers had similar models for agent
preferences, but advocated different notions of fairness. We formalize both fairness notions
in economic terms, extending them to apply to a larger family of utilities. Noting that in
settings with such utilities efficiency is easily achieved in multiple ways, we study notions
of fairness as criteria for choosing between different efficient allocations. Our technical
results are algorithms for finding fair allocations corresponding to two fairness notions:
Regarding the notion suggested by Ghodsi et al., we present a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes an allocation for a general class of fairness notions, in which their notion
is included. For the other, suggested by Dolev et al., we show that a competitive market
equilibrium achieves the desired notion of fairness, thereby obtaining a polynomial-time
algorithm that computes such a fair allocation and solving the main open problem raised
by Dolev et al.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the classic question of allocating resources among different potential
agents. Specifically, we are interested in this question in the context of computer systems that
need to share their computational resources among different agents. Resources in this context
can be CPU time, main memory, disk space, communication links, etc. The agents may be
jobs, computers, or software agents representing them, and the allocation may be implemented
at the level of the network routers, the operating system, or by higher level software, whether
centralized or distributed.
The departure point of this work is several recent attempts to look at the allocation prob-
lem in computer systems in abstract principled terms; by Dolev et al.[6] and Ghodsi et al.[9].
In these papers, the basic model assumed that each agent desires a well-defined bundle of re-
sources, and the allocation problem is to decide which fraction of his bundle each agent gets.
While the treatment is abstract, it is very clear that the motivation came directly from actual
computer systems. We wish to explicitly point out a key difference between the literature on
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allocating resources in computer systems and the general economic literature on resource al-
location, a difference we believe explains the near complete separation between the two: The
computing literature almost always assumes that each agent desires a well-defined bundle of
resources, while the economic literature almost always considers the trade off that agents have
between different resources.
The standard example of resource allocation by an operating system has each job requesting
a well-specified set of resources (e.g. 1000 CPUs with 1TB of main memory and 1GB/sec of
communication bandwidth), and allocates among such requests. We do not often see systems
that can handle requests like “either 1000 CPUs with 2TB main memory or 2000 CPUs with
1TB main memory”. In fact, even when the underlying problem allows a trade-off between
several possible bundles of resources, the allocation system usually first decides on a bundle
for each agent and then attempts to allocate these chosen bundles to all agents. An example
is routing in a network, where the routing decision of choosing a path to the destination is
in practice completely decoupled from the bandwidth-allocation decision for the links on the
chosen path.
On the other hand, the economics literature on resource allocation usually focuses on the
trade-offs between different resources that are captured by agent preferences. The fact that for
some agent an apple may be a substitute to an orange results in a flexibility in preferences that
allows sophisticated trade that can be beneficial to all parties (Figure 1a).
The case where consumers’ preferences do not allow any substitution between different
goods is called the case of “perfect complements” (Figure 1b), with the basic example be-
ing Leontief utilities: For any quantity vector (x1, ..., xm) of m resources, u is defined as
u(x1...xm) = minj(xj/rj), where the rjs are the relative proportions needed of the differ-
ent goods [4]. These are the utilities used (implicitly) by [6, 9] to capture the preferences in
computer systems, and are the focus of attention of this paper. However, the relations between
resources are not necessary linear. It could be that some agents’ demand of bandwidth would be
in quadratic relation to number of CPUs, and that RAM would be proportional to log(DISK).
The generalization to perfectly complementary functions is required to capture such relations.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Figure 1a shows an indifference map for a utility function with some degree of substitution between goods. Figure 1b shows the
indifference map of a perfectly complementary utility. Each indifference curve is the set of all allocations resulting in the same utility.
It is important to state that throughout this work, we do not assume or make any interper-
sonal comparisons of utility [10] - we use utility functions solely as a way to define agents’
preferences over bundles.
Our first contribution in this paper is putting the question of allocation of computer re-
sources studied in [6, 9] into an economic framework, obtaining a general economic perspective
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that we believe is useful. We observe that when agents have perfectly complementary prefer-
ences, the requirement of Pareto-efficiency turns out to be quite weak and simple: it suffices
that the allocation is (what we term) non-wasteful: no agent receives resources that he has no
use for, and no useful resources are left on the table. As a result, efficiency does not require any
form of trade between agents, and there is no need for “money” as a mechanism of ensuring
efficiency. This underlying lack of trade may explain the applicability to computer systems,
which usually lack the infrastructure for enabling trade. It may also suggest potential appli-
cability in other scenarios where trade is impossible due to technical, administrative, legal, or
ethical reasons.
However, this requirement alone leaves us with multiple possible allocations (as seen in
Figure 2b as opposed to Figure 2a). Therefore, the question of choosing between the efficient
allocations becomes the central one, as indeed was done by [6, 9] in different ways, using
different terminology and definitions of fairness.
(a) With Substitutes (b) Perfect Complements
Figure 2: Figure 2a is an Edgeworth box of continuous indifference curves with substitutes. In this case, if two curves are tangent to each
other, there is a single point of tangency. As a result, the Pareto set is single dimensional.
Figure 2b is an Edgeworth box with curves corresponding to the perfectly complementary case. Here, two curves may have many points of
tangency, corresponding to allocations of the under-demanded goods. As a result, the Pareto efficient allocations are in the whole shaded area.
After formalizing our notions, which generalize those in [6, 9] to the framework of perfectly
complementary utilities, we embark on the study of these fairness notions “Bottleneck Based
Fairness” (BBF), advocated by [6], and “Dominant Resource Fairness” (DRF), used as the
fairness property of the mechanism in [9].
Behind BBF there is the notion that when each agent is entitled to some percent of all
resources, he has a “justified complaint” against an allocation if he gets less than that percentage
on all “bottleneck” resources. An allocation is called BBF if no agent has a justified complaint
against it. Regarding DRF, we view the notion as composed of two elements: The first element
is a norm-like mechanism that quantifies and allows comparing bundles of resources allocated
to a single agent. The second element dictates that fairness is defined according to Rawlsian
[12] max-min fairness of these quantities. Meaning, fairness should be decided by the agent
that received the least according to the quantification of bundles. DRF uses the L∞ norm (i.e.
looking at the highest allocated share over all resources); we note any norm is equally viable.
This general norm-like mechanism defines a class of fairness notions that we call “Generalized
Resource Fairness” (GRF) (see examples in Figure 3). A somewhat related generalization of
DRF can be found in [11].
At this point come our main technical results - both quite simple given the wider context
which we have built. We present two algorithms for finding fair allocations according to each
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of these fairness notions. Our first algorithm finds an allocation satisfying any given fairness
notion from the GRF class. It is similar, in concept, to the family of “water-filling” algorithms
[5, 2]. We extend the observation of [9] that greedily allocating the resources to the “poorest”
agent at each stage produces a fair allocation. In [9] this was done in a pseudo-polynomial
way (allocating δ-by-δ fractions of the goods1) for DRF and Leontief utilities. We give an
algorithm which is polynomial for a wide subclass of perfectly complementary utilities and
any GRF notion of fairness (given minimal access to an oracle describing the utilities and
desired fairness-norm), and becomes strongly polynomial for Leontief utilities.
Our second algorithmic result solves the main problem left open by [6]: obtaining a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing a BBF allocation. Our contribution here is a direct corollary of
phrasing the problem in a market context, in which each agent enters the market with some
quantity of each good (his endowment), or with a budget (some amount of money). We recast
the entitlements of [6] in terms of budgets in a Fisher market2 (see e.g. [4]), and look at compet-
itive market equilibria of this market. Our main observation is then that any market equilibrium
in this context will be BBF. This both proves the existence of a BBF allocation for all perfectly
complementary utilities, and solves the main problem of [6] for Leontief utilities, for which
an equilibrium in a Fisher market can be found in polynomial-time using convex programming
[3]. Note that Ghodsi et al. already compared their results with a market equilibrium.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 sets our notions, notations, and
basic facts about efficiency with perfectly complementary preferences. In Section 3 we define
and discuss various notions of fairness of allocation in this context, in Section 4 we present the
algorithm for GRF fairness and in Section 5 we develop the market context which implies the
algorithm for BBF.
2 The Model
2.1 Some Notation
We use the following notation: For ~x, ~z∈<m -
• We write ~x 6 ~z if ∀j, xj 6 zj .
• We write ~x < ~z if ~x 6 ~z and for some j we have strict inequality: xj < zj .
• We write ~x ~z if for all j, xj < zj .
• Throughout the paper, i∈ [n], j∈ [m]. ~xi denotes the ith column vector of a matrix X .
• Given a matrix X=(xij) ∈ <n×m, X+~z=(~x1+~z, ..., ~xn+~z)
2.2 Basic Setup
We study a setup with m infinitely divisible resources, wanted by n agents.
1[9] also suggest a polynomial-time algorithm which provides DRF for a discrete setup, a case which we do
not study here.
2In terms of an Arrow-Debreu market [1], this is the scenario in which agents have equal endowments of all
goods.
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Definition 1. Given quantities for goods ~q ∈ <m+ , an allocation is a matrix X ∈ <n×m+ with∑
i x
i
j6qj for all j.
Unless stated otherwise, we assume without loss of generality that qj=1 for all j, in which
case xij denotes the fraction of good j that bidder i gets.
Each bidder i has a utility function ui(xi1, ..., x
i
m) that denotes his utility from receiving the
bundle composed of xij fraction of each resource j. Our definitions and results are insensitive
to the cardinal properties of ui and only depend on ordinal ones, so we could have equivalently
modeled agent preferences using a preference relation ≺i. Specifically, it means that we do
not make any interpersonal comparisons of utility [10]. We make the standard assumption that
utility functions are non-decreasing, that is - if ~x ≥ ~y, then u(~x) > u(~y). Additionally, each
agent has an entitlement ei, with
∑
i ei = 1 , intuitively stating how much he brought into the
system or “deserves” of the system. It is useful to think of an agent’s entitlement as 1/n, when
n is the number of agents, but, following [6], we also allow any pre-defined entitlements ei
such that
∑
i ei=1, where the general intention is that an agent with twice the entitlement of
another one “deserves” twice the allocation.
Definition 2. x is called maximal for u if for all y, u(x) > u(y).
Definition 3. A utility function u is called strictly monotonic if for every non-maximal ~x, and
all ~y >> ~x. We say it is non-satiable3 if it is strictly monotonic and has no maximal ~x.
If u is not non-satiable, we say that it is satiable, and u is satiated at ~x if u(~x)> u(~y) for
all ~y∈<m+ .
2.3 Parsimonious Allocations
For the utilities in question, it is often the case that an agent can relinquish some of his bun-
dle without reducing his utility. For clarity, and without losing generality, we will focus on
allocations where this is not true. We use ~x ⇓ ~z to denote a pointwise-minimum, that is
~x ⇓ ~z = (min(x1, z1), ...,min(xm, zm)).
Definition 4. A bundle ~x is a parsimonious bundle for u if for all ~z < ~x we have that
u(~z) < u(~x). An allocation is called parsimonious w.r.t utility functions u1, ..., un if each
~xi is a parsimonious bundle w.r.t to ui.
Proposition 1. If u is continuous, then for every bundle ~x there exists a parsimonious bundle ~y
such that ~y6~x and u(~x)=u(~y).
Proof. Let L =
{
~z ∈ <m+ |u(~x)=u(~z) and ~z 6 ~x
}
. This set is compact (it is closed by the
continuity of u and bounded since ~z 6 ~x), so a ~y ∈ L that minimizes ∑j yj over all ~z ∈ L
exists. Since ~y ∈ L, we must have ~y 6 ~x and u(~x)=u(~y). For any bundle such that ~z < ~y, it
holds that ~z 6 ~x and
∑
j zj <
∑
j yj . Hence, it must be the case that u(~z) < u(~x), otherwise
z ∈ L and ~y does not minimize∑j zj in L .
3One can verify that strictly monotonic and non-satiable is equivalent to the standard economic term “locally
non-satiable for all x”.
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2.4 Perfect Complementarity
Perfectly Complementary utility functions could be defined in several ways.
Definition 5. A utility function u is perfectly complementary if for all ~x, ~y we have that u(~x ⇓
~y)=min (u(~x), u(~y)).
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent if u is continuous:
1. u is perfectly complementary.
2. For all parsimonious bundles ~x, ~y, either ~x 6 ~y or ~y 6 ~x.
3. There exists a function w : <+ → (<+ ∪ {∞})m, called the parsimonious bundle rep-
resentation of u, such that for all t > 0 we have that u(~x) > t if and only if ~x > w(t).
That is, u obtains utility level at least t exactly when it gets at least wj(t) amount of every
good j.
Proof. Assume u is continuous.
1 ⇒ 2 (¬2 ⇒ ¬1): Let ~x, ~y ∈ <m+ be two parsimonious bundles such that neither ~x > ~y
nor ~y > ~x. Let ~z=~x ⇓ ~y. This means that there is some j for which xj < yj and some l such
that xl > yl. Clearly, ~z < ~x and ~z < ~y. Since they are both parsimonious bundles, u(~z) < u(~x)
and u(~z) < u(~y), and therefore u(~z) < min (u(~x), u(~y)).
2⇒ 3: Define w(t) for all t > 0 to be a parsimonious bundle achieving utility level t (and
∞ if such a bundle does not exist). We need to show that u(~x) > t if and only if ~x > w(t).
(⇐) Take a bundle ~y > w(t). Then, from the monotonicity of u, u(~y) > u(w(t))= t.
(⇒) Let ~y be some bundle such that u(~y) > t and let ~z 6 ~y be a parsimonious bundle
with u(~z)=u(~y) (which exists by Proposition 1). Since ~z and w(t) are both parsimonious, by
assumption, either ~z > w(t) or ~z 6 w(t). If it is the latter, u(~z) 6 u(w(t)) = t which means
u(~z)= t resulting in ~z=w(t) (otherwise, w(t) is not parsimonious). Either way, ~y > ~z > w(t),
as required.
3 ⇒ 1: We trivially have that u(~x ⇓ ~y) 6 min (u(~x), u(~y)) so we only need to show the
opposite inequality. Let t=min(u(~x), u(~y)). From (3) it follows that ~x > w(t) and ~y > w(t),
and so ~x ⇓ ~y > w(t) so u(~x ⇓ ~y) > t as required.
This concludes the proof that the three definitions are equivalent for a continuous utility
function u.
Lemma 1. If ~x is a parsimonious bundle and u is a perfectly complementary utility function,
then ~x = w(u(~x))
Proof. Since u is perfectly complementary, by Proposition 2, ~x > w(u(~x)). Since ~x is a
parsimonious bundle, for all ~z < ~x, u(~z) < u(~x). Let ~z=w(u(~x)). By definition, u(~z)=u(~x).
However, if there exists some j such that xj > zj , it contradicts ~x being parsimonious.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that w(t) must be non-decreasing. However, the parsimo-
nious bundle representation w of a continuous perfectly complementary utility u is not always
continuous itself. It turns out that u being strictly monotonic is equivalent to the continuity of
w (for all t ∈ [0,max~xu(~x)]).
Lemma 2. A continuous perfectly complementary utility u is strictly monotonic if and only if
its parsimonious bundle representation w is continuous on the domain {t|0 6 t 6 max~xu(~x)}.
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Proof. (If): Take a point ~x for which u is not satiated, u(~x) = tx, and some ~y such that ~y  ~x.
Consider w(tx)+ε) for some ε > 0, which is a parsimonious bundle with utility tx+ε > tx.
(Since u is not satiated at ~x,∞ w(tx)+ε) for a small enough ε). Since ~y  ~x = w(tx) (by
Lemma 1 ), by continuity of w, for sufficiently small ε we still have ~y  w(tx)+ε), and so
u(~y) > tx+ε > tx, as needed.
(Only if): Let (α, z−j) be the vector obtained from replacing ~z’s jth coordinate by α. By
definition, each coordinate of w is non-decreasing, so to prove continuity it suffices to prove
for every coordinate j that there are no gaps in the values that wj(t) attains. Assume that a
certain value β = wj(t) is achieved. We need to show that for all 0 6 α < β, there exists a
parsimonious bundle w(t′) such that wj(t′)=α.
Take some bundle ~z  w(t). Let t′=u(α, z−j), and consider w(t′). From the monotonicity
of u, and Proposition 1, it follows that ~z  w(t) > w(t′). Since w(t′) is parsimonious, by
definition, wj(t′) ≤ α. It must be, therefore, that wj(t′)=α, since otherwise, w(t′) (α, z−j),
which contradicts u being strictly monotonic.
In addition, perfectly complementary utilities are inherently quasi-concave.
Definition 6. u is quasi-concave if u(~x) > u(~y) implies that u(λ~x+(1 − λ)~y) > u(~y) for all
0 < λ < 1. It is strictly quasi-concave if u(~x) > u(~y) implies that u(λ~x+(1− λ)~y) > u(~y) for
all 0 < λ < 1.
Lemma 3. Every perfectly complementary utility u is quasi-concave.
Proof. Given a perfectly complementary utility function u, look at any pair ~x, ~y such that
u(~x) > u(~y). Let u(x) = t1 and u(y) = t2. By Proposition 2, ~x > w(t1) and ~y > w(t2).
By Proposition 2 and the monotonicity of w, w(t1) > w(t2). Then, for all goods j and any
λ ∈ (0, 1) :
λxj+(1− λ)yj ≥ λwj(t1)+(1− λ)wj(t2)
> λwj(t2)+(1− λ)wj(t2)
= wj(t2)
Therefore, u(λ~x+(1− λ)~y) > u(w(t2))=u(~y).
If the utility function u is also strictly monotonic, we can make the following stronger
statement:
Lemma 4. Every perfectly complementary and strictly monotonic utility function u is strictly
quasi-concave.
Proof. Let ~x, ~y be two bundles such that u(~x) > u(~y). Let u(~x) = t1, u(~y) = t2, and ~z =
λ~x+(1 − λ)~y. Given j, if yj > xj , then yj > zj > xj >wj(t1). Otherwise, xj > zj > yj ,
there is some tˆj > t2 such that wj(tˆj)= zj (Lemma 2). For tˆ=min(minj(tˆj), t1), tˆ > t2 and
therefore ~z > w(tˆ). Hence, by definition u(~z) > tˆ > t2=u(~y) as required.
Example: Leontief Functions
Leontief utilities are one example of perfectly complementary utility functions. These util-
ity functions express an interest in a certain fixed proportion of resources.
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u is Leontief if u(~x) = minj∈S(xj/rj) for some constants ~r > 0, where S = {j|rj > 0}.
This means that in order to obtain utility level t > 0, the agent needs at least rjt fraction of
each good j. Thus, the parsimonious bundle for each utility level t is w(t)=(r1t, ..., rmt).
Leontief utilities are non-satiable. The utilities considered in [6] are satiable versions of
Leontief utilities: u(~x) = min(1,minj∈S(xj/rj)), where 06 rj 6 1; i.e. the maximum utility
of 1 is obtained at the minimal saturation bundle (r1...rm). We call these satiable Leontief
utilities.
Note that a parsimonious bundle ~x for an agent with a Leontief utility needs to obtain the
minimum on all coordinates, and therefore maintains ~x = α~r for some constant α.
2.5 Efficiency
The first requirement from an allocation is obviously to be efficient. We start with a very
weak notion of efficiency that intuitively does not assume the possibility of trade. Though in
general this notion of efficiency is significantly weaker than Pareto efficiency, we show that for
perfectly complementary utilities it implies Pareto efficiency.
Definition 7. An allocation is non-wasteful if :
1. For all i, the bundle ~xi is parsimonious for ui.
2. ∀i ui(~xi+~z)=ui(~xi) where zj=1−
∑
i x
i
j .
Intuitively, these are allocations where no agent gets more unless it improves his utility, and
goods are left on the table only if they cannot improve the agents’ utilities.
Our interest is in economies where trade does not promote efficiency (the opposite of what
is usual in economic theory).
Let ~u(X)=(u1(~x1), ..., un(~xn)).
Definition 8. An allocation X is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation Z such that
~u(Z) > ~u(X).
Pareto-efficiency is stronger than being non-wasteful as it also requires that no bilateral
(and multi-lateral) trade that is mutually beneficial is possible, while non-wasteful only requires
goods not to be left on the table if they can be of any use to anyone. However, for perfectly
complementary utilities, non-wastefulness is a sufficient condition for Pareto-efficiency. To ob-
tain equivalence we must add the requirement of parsimony to Pareto-efficiency. We can add it
without loss of generality as we can replace any Pareto efficient allocationX by a parsimonious
allocation Y 6 X that provides all agents with the same utilities.
Definition 9. An economy u1, ..., un is called a no-trade economy if every non-wasteful alloca-
tion is also Pareto efficient.
Proposition 3. An economy composed of perfectly complementary utilities is a no-trade econ-
omy.
Proof. Let X be some non-wasteful allocation for n perfectly complementary bidders. Let
zj = 1 −
∑
i x
i
j . Since X is non-wasteful, for all i, ui(~x
i) = ui(~x
i+~z). Assume, by way of
contradiction, that there is an allocation Y such that ~u(Y ) > ~u(X) = ~u(X+~z). Therefore,
there is some i for which ui(~yi) > ui(~xi). We can assume, w.l.o.g, that Y is a parsimonious
allocation. By Proposition 2, ~yi > ~xi. Since Y is an allocation, it must hold that yi − xi 6
1−∑k xk, but that contradicts X being non-wasteful.
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3 Fairness Notions
Fairness of an allocation is an elusive concept. There are many opinions on what counts as
fair, which sometimes vary depending on the application. As a result, there are many fairness
notions for allocations in various models. Some recent papers dealing with the same motivation
suggested different fairness notions. One was introduced by Dolev et al. [6] and the other by
Ghodsi et al. [9]. In this section, we rephrase the definitions of [6] and [9], generalize, and
compare them.4
3.1 Dominant / Generalized Resource Fairness
The notion of “Dominant Resource Fairness” was advocated in [9]. Conceptually, we view this
notion as combining two elements: the first is the choice of defining fairness between the agents
in the Rawlsian [12] sense of maximizing the welfare of the poorest agent, and the second is
the choice of quantifying the allocation of an agent according to the maximum share of any
resource he got. We generalize this notion of fairness by sticking to the first element of fairness
and allowing a variety of choices for the second.
Let || · || be a norm on <m. We think of ||~xi|| as our measure of “how much” i obtains - a
scalar that quantifies the bundle ~xi. In fact, we don’t really need all the properties of a norm,
just monotonicity and continuity.
Definition 10. Given a norm || · || on <m and two parsimonious allocations X, Y ∈ <n×m+
(where ~xi, ~yi are column vectors in X, Y respectively). We say that X is fairer than Y (accord-
ing to || · ||) if
min
i:||~xi||6=||~yi||
(||~xi||) > min
i:||~xi||6=||~yi||
(||~yi||)
That is, if we look at the agent with the minimal allocation that differs between X and Y , then
that agent gets (weakly) more in X . Generalizing to the case that agents come with pre-defined
entitlements, we also say that X is fairer than Y under entitlements e1, ..., en if
min
i:||~xi||6=||~yi||
(||~xi/ei||) > min
i:||~xi||6=||~yi||
(||~yi/ei||)
We say that an allocation X is || · ||-fair if for every other allocation Y , we have that X is fairer
than Y (And similarly for fairness under entitlements.).
In [9], the L∞ norm was used, and the fairness notion was termed “Dominant Resource
Fairness” (DRF). Other natural choices would be the L1 norm, referred to as “Asset Fairness”
in [9], which counts total resource use, and intermediate norms such as L2. The following
example shows the different fair allocations for these three choices of norm:
As seen in Figure 3, it is hard to tell which norm provides an intuitively fairer allocation,
and each may be appropriate in some cases. One may argue that L∞ is unfair since agent C
receives too much in total resources, while L1 is unfair as C receives too little of any specific
resource. L2 gives an intermediate allocation, but then again, it may be argued that C still
receives too much in total.
4In the case of Ghodsi et al., since the paper has a systems flavor, we use our understanding of their somewhat
informal definitions.
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(a) Request Matrix
(b) L∞ (c) L1 (d) L2
Figure 3: Figure 3a depicts the agents’ interest in the resources and their respective entitlements. Figures (b)-(d) show the different allocations
corresponding to three different norms. 0.41.. is the solution to the equation 2x2 = (1− x)2.
3.2 No Justified Complaints
This fairness notion was originally stated using Leontief utilities. We suggest a generalization
of this fairness notion to perfectly complementary utilities:
Definition 11. No Justified Complaints for PC utilities An allocation X has the property of
“No Justified Complaints” (NJC) if for all agents i:
1. ~xi is a parsimonious bundle.
2. Either there is some “bottleneck” good j such that
∑
i x
i
j = 1 with x
i
j > ei, or ui is
satiated at ~xi: ui(~xi) > ui(~z) for all ~z ∈ <m.
If an allocation has the NJC property, we will say it is “Bottleneck-Based Fair” (BBF).
Restricting the above definition to satiable Leontief utilities reduces to the original defini-
tion in [6].
One can easily verify that the examples of ||·||-fair allocations above are all BBF. Of course,
all criticism of these allocations applies to BBF as well. However, not all || · ||-fair allocations
are BBF. The examples in Figure 4 show that BBF and norm-fairness are unrelated notions.
4 Computing a Norm-Fair Allocation
The basic idea of [9] is that a greedy allocation rule approaches dominant resource fairness: at
each stage the “poorest” agent gets another ε of his required bundle. We observe that the same
is true in general for all || · ||-fairness notions, and show how the pseudo-polynomial algorithm
presented in [9] may be converted into a fully polynomial-time allocation algorithm. We will
present the algorithm in general terms and assume the following minimal type of oracle access
to the underlying utilities and norm.
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(a) Request Matrix
(b) L∞ (c) L1 (d) L2 (e) BBF
Figure 4: In the setup above, none of the || · ||-Fair allocations is BBF, since agent A does not have his entitlement of a bottleneck resource.
(4e) shows a BBF allocation of this setup, that does not satisfy any of the aforementioned norm-fairness notions.
Our algorithm applies to continuous, strictly monotonic, perfectly complementary utilities
with the following additional property:
Definition 12. Let u be a perfectly complementary function, and ~x, ~y ∈ <m+ be two parsimo-
nious bundles with respect to u. We call u compatible with a norm || · || if u(~x) > u(~y) implies
||~x|| > ||~y||.
Lemma 5. Every perfectly complementary utility is compatible with Lp for every 1 6 p <∞.
Leontief and satiable Leontief utilities are also compatible with L∞.
Proof. Let u be a perfectly complementary utility function, and let ~x, ~y be two parsimonious
bundles such that u(~x) > u(~y). Let u(~x)= t and u(~y)= t′. Since ~x, ~y are parsimonious, and u
is monotonic, it follows that ~x ≥ ~y (Proposition 2). It cannot be the case that ~x=~y since t > t′,
so ~x > ~y.
~x > ~y, so xj > yj for all j, with at least one inequality strict. Therefore,
∑
j xj
p >
∑
j yj
p
and from the monotonicity of p√, we obtain that ||~x||p > ||~y||p as required.
For Leontief utilities, these parsimonious bundles are t · ~r and t′ · ~r, so in the case of L∞:
||t · ~r||∞= t ·maxj(~r) > t′ ·maxj(~r)= ||t′ · ~r||∞, as required.
The above applies trivially to satiable utilities as well, since for bundles at which u is sati-
ated, there will not exist a bundle that gives a higher utility.
Lemma 5 implies that if a perfectly complementary utility function is compatible with a
norm, every || · ||-fair value corresponds to a single parsimonious allocation.
We need to describe how a utility function ui and a norm || · || are accessed. We assume
that is provided by the following type of oracle query:
Given a fairness level h, return the parsimonious bundle ~xi for i with ||~xi||=h.
Notice that this type of oracle access is no stronger than direct access to ui or its correspond-
ing parsimonious representation wi, as given access to wi(t) one can use binary search over t
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to find a bundle with ||wi(t)||=h, and given only direct access to ui one can recover wi(t) by
binary search on every index (i.e., wi1(t) is the smallest α such that ui(α, 1, ..., 1) = t). We
prefer this formalization of access since it does not directly use the cardinal utilities but only
their ordinal properties, and so will often be more natural. For example, for Leontief utilities,
where ui(~x)=minj(xj/rj), the reply for query h would be ~x=h · ~r/||~r||.
We use this oracle in the following basic step of the algorithm:
Allocation Step(S,q) (For a given || · ||) :
Input:
A set S of agents and a vector of remaining quantities q=(q1...qm).
Output: Returns the maximum h such that each i ∈ S can be given a parsimonious ~xi with
||~xi||=h · ei and yet stay within the given quantities: for all j,
∑
i x
i
j 6 qj . It also returns the
parsimonious allocation (X) with ||~xi||=h.
Algorithm: To find h, one may use binary search given the access to the utility functions
specified above.
Note that this algorithm allows us to get arbitrarily close to h, but cannot guarantee that h
is accurate. This step is therefore, in general, pseudo-polynomial.
For the special case of Leontief utilities where for each agent i, ui(~x) = minj(xj/rij), the
following is a direct solution: h=minj(qj · ||~ri||/
∑
i eir
i
j).
There are two possible reasons that may limit h: either one of the agents gets satiated at the
parsimonious bundle corresponding to h or (at least) one of the items got exhausted.
Lemma 6. If all utilities are perfectly complementary, continuous, strictly monotonic and com-
patible with || · || then AllocationStep returns an allocation where either for some i ∈ S,
ui(~x
i) > ui(~y) for all ~y or for some j for which qj > 0,
∑
i x
i
j=qj .
Proof. Let ti=ui(~xi). Assume by way of contradiction that there is some ε > 0 small enough
such that for all j,
∑
i∈S w
i
j(ti+ ε) 6 qj (note that if ti is the maximal value of ui, then
wij(ti+ε) =∞ for all j). By Lemma 2, it must be the case that wi(ti+ε) > wi(ti). Since ui
is compatible with || · || for all i, ||wi(ti+ε)|| > ||wi(ti)||= h for all i, which contradicts h’s
maximality under the constraints.
Now we have the following algorithm:
Initialize S to be all agents and q to be initial quantities.
while S 6= ∅ do
h, (X)=AllocationStep(S, q).
G← {j|∑i xij=qj} // Exhausted items
Let F be the set of agents i such that for all parsimonious bundles ~y with ||~y|| > h we
have yj > xij for some j ∈ G.
q=q −∑i∈F ~xi
S=S \ F
end while
Theorem 1. This algorithm outputs the || · ||-fair allocation under entitlements e1, ..., en for all
continuous, strictly monotonic and perfectly complementary utility functions compatible with
|| · ||.
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Proof. First we notice that this algorithm terminates, since at every allocation step either some
agent is satiated at the parsimonious allocation corresponding to h (and then leaves S) or some
good is exhausted (and enters G), and since S never increases and G never decreases, we can
have at most n+m allocation steps.
We now prove correctness, by induction over the number of iterations of the main loop.
Let Y be a parsimonious || · ||-fair allocation, and X be the allocation of the current step of
the algorithm, and let X ′ be the allocation of the previous step. Similarly, let S ′ be the set of
non-exhausted agents in the end of the previous step, and S be the set at the end of the current
step. Note that for all i, ~xi > ~x′i, since the algorithm never diminishes allocations. We prove
the following invariants by induction. The theorem follows directly.
1. If i ∈ S then ||~xi|| 6 ||~yi||.
2. If i 6∈ S then ||~xi||= ||~yi||.
Basis: Right after the initialization phase, ~xi = ~0 for all i (which means ||~xi|| = 0) and
S=[n]) so (1) holds trivially and (2) holds vacuously.
Step: Assume that the above is true for X ′. For all i 6∈ S ′ ||~yi|| = ||~x′i|| = ||~xi||, from
the assumption and the fact that the algorithm does not change allocations of agents not in
S ′. Since we assumed Y is || · ||-fair, for all i ∈ S ′, ||~yi|| ≥ ||~xi|| = h since otherwise
min{i:||~xi||6=||~yi||} ||~xi|| > min{i:||~xi||6=||~yi||} ||~yi|| and Y ’s fairness is contradicted. Since S ( S ′,
(1) is proven. Now, let’s look at i ∈ S ′ \ S. It can’t be that ||~yi|| > h since AllocationStep
chooses the maximal h for which the allocation is both parsimonious and valid, so ||~yi||=h for
each i ∈ S ′ \ S. We obtain therefore that for all i 6∈ S, ||~yi||= ||~xi|| as required.
Observe that these two invariants imply that at the end of the algorithm, X=Y for any || · ||-
fair allocation, which not only proves the correctness of the algorithm, but also the uniqueness
of the fair allocation.
5 Competitive Equilibria and Bottleneck Based Fairness
In this section we develop a close connection between the problem of finding a BBF allocation
and the problem of finding an equilibrium in a Fisher Market, a special case of an Arrow-
Debreu market that is often more computationally tractable. As corollaries of this connec-
tion and known results, we get both a general existence result, generalizing that of [6], and a
polynomial-time algorithm for agents with Leontief utilities.
A Fisher Market is a market model where n unrelated agents are interested in m different,
infinitely divisible goods, each available in some quantity qj . Each agent has a preference over
bundles, given by a utility function ui, and a budget (“money”) that he will use to trade with
the other agents towards a better bundle. The question of the existence and computation of
equilibria in this setup has been well studied in mathematical economics, and more recently in
computational economics (to state just a few references: [1, 7, 8], see [4] for a recent survey).
5.1 Fisher Market Equilibrium: Definition and Existence
A market equilibrium is a state where all agents are no longer interested in trading with their
peers. In a Fisher Market, an equilibrium state is defined by the following two conditions (see
[4]).
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Definition 13. In a market setting with n agents interested in m infinitely divisible goods,
where agents’ preferences over bundles are given by a utility function ui, and each agent has
a budget ei > 0, an equilibrium is defined as a pair of price vector pi ∈ <m+ and an allocation
X ∈ <n×m+ with the following two properties:
1. The vector ~xi maximizes ui(~xi) under the constraints
∑
j pijx
i
j 6 ei and ~xi ∈ <m+ .
2. For each good j ∈ [m],∑i xij=qj
It is imperative to understand that the two conditions are in some sense independent. When
an agent calculates the bundle satisfying condition 1, he does not take into account the avail-
ability of goods in the market. If agents demand more than the available goods, the prices must
go up - until an equilibrium is reached.
Fisher Market is a special case of the market studied by Arrow and Debreu, where all agents
arrive to the market with the same proportions of all goods ([4]). Thus, as a corollary of the
Arrow and Debreu Theorem ([1]), given a Fisher market as described above, an equilibrium
exists if the following conditions hold:
• ui is continuous
• ui is strictly quasi-concave (Definition 6).
• ui is non-satiable:5 For all ~x ∈ <m+ , there is an ~x′ ∈ <m+ such that ui(~x′) > ui(~x)
From Lemma 4, every perfectly complementary and strictly monotonic utility function is
strictly quasi-concave, so we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For a setup with continuous, strictly monotonic, non-satiable and perfectly com-
plementary utility functions ui, there exists a Fisher market equilibrium.
5.2 The Non-Satiable Case
The main point of this subsection is that market equilibrium for continuous perfectly com-
plementary and non-satiable utilities is BBF. The next subsection will observe that the non-
satiability is not really required for strictly monotonic utilities.
Theorem 2. Let u1, ..., un be perfectly complementary, continuous, strictly monotonic and non-
satiable utility functions. Let e1, ..., en be the agents’ budgets, let (pi,X) be a Fisher Market
equilibrium in a market where qj = 1 for all j, and let Y 6 X be the parsimonious allocation
such that for all i, ui(~yi)=ui(~xi). Then Y is BBF.
Proof. Let F = {j|pij = 0} be the “free” goods. First notice that since the uis are strictly
monotonic, continuous and non-satiable, we must have that all agents exhaust their budget,
that is
∑
j pijx
i
j = ei for all i, as otherwise the remaining money could then be used to buy a
little bit extra of each good, thereby increasing i’s utility, contradicting the requirement that ~xi
maximizes i’s utility within budget. As
∑
i x
i
j = qj =1, it follows that
∑
j pij =
∑
j
∑
i x
i
jpij =∑
i
∑
j x
i
jpij =
∑
i ei = 1. Now notice that for j 6∈ F we must have xij = yij for all i, since
otherwise agent i could demand only yij of good j saving (x
i
j − yij)pij money, which could then
5Note that if u is strictly monotonic (Definition 3) and there is no ~x in which u is satiated, then it is non-satiable.
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be used to buy a little bit extra of each good. Thus, ei=
∑
j pijx
i
j =
∑
j 6∈F pijx
i
j =
∑
j 6∈F pijy
i
j .
But since
∑
j 6∈F pij =
∑
j pij =1 we have a convex combination of y
i
j over all j 6∈ F that sums
to ei, and it follows that for some j 6∈ F , yij > ei. The proof is concluded by noting that all
j 6∈ F are bottleneck resources in the allocation Y , since for all j /∈ F , 1=∑i xij=∑i yij .
5.3 The Satiable Case
Theorem 2 applies to almost all continuous, strictly monotonic and perfectly complementary
utilities. The crux lies in the non-satiability assumption. In this subsection, we show that this
assumption is, in fact, without loss of generality. Starting with a satiable, strictly monotonic,
continuous and perfectly complementary function, we can convert it to a similarly character-
ized non-satiable function by adding a resource that only the agent whose utility is satiable is
interested in.
Given a parsimonious bundle representation wi of a strictly monotonic, perfectly comple-
mentary and satiable utility function ui, and assuming, w.l.o.g, that the maximal value of ui
is 1 (otherwise, we normalize the function, without affecting any of its other properties), we
define the parsimonious representation w′i of a continuous, perfectly complementary, strictly
monotonic and non-satiable utility as follows:
w′i(t)=
{
(wi1(t), ..., w
i
m(t), t) t 6 1
t · (wi1(1), ..., wim(1), 1) t > 1
Let u′i be the perfectly complementary utility function defined by w
′i.
Proposition 4. If ui is continuous, strictly monotonic, and perfectly complementary, then u′i is
continuous, strictly monotonic, perfectly complementary and non-satiable. Moreover, if ui is
satiable Leontief, then u′i is Leontief.
Proof. Since we defined u′i using the parsimonious bundle representation w
i, it is perfectly
complementary by definition. It’s also trivial to see that u is non-satiable. It remains to show it
is continuous and strictly monotonic. Both are true for t < 1 as witu′i coincides with ui there;
both are true for t > 1 as u′i is just a Leontief utility in that range; and at t=1 we get the same
value from the two parts, thereby maintaining both continuity and consistency.
If ui is satiable Leontief, then u′i could be otherwise written as: u
′′
i = minj∈[m+1](x
i
j/r
i
j),
where rim+1=1, and the remaining constants are unchanged. This is clearly a standard Leontief
function, and it is trivially equivalent to the function constructed above.
Lemma 7. Let u′i be the extension of the satiable perfectly complementary utility ui for all i.
Then if an allocation is BBF with respect to the u′is it is also BBF with respect to the uis.
Proof. Given an allocation X = (~x1, ..., ~xn) that is an equilibrium with respect to (u′1, ..., u
′
n),
we need to show that the conditions of BBF hold with respect to (u1, ..., un). We know that for
each agent i, there exists some j ∈ J such that xij > ei, where J=
{
j|∑i xij=1} (since u′i has
no maximum, the other option is irrelevant).
To show that with respect to the original utilities and setup the very same allocation is BBF,
we have to discard all “virtual resources” added when extending the utilities.
Let J={j|∑i xij=1} be the set of bottleneck resources in the given allocation. Let J ′ ⊆ J
be the set of bottleneck resources after the virtual ones have been discarded. Given an agent i,
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if J does not include the “virtual resource?? added for i, then after the discard there still exists
j ∈ J ′ such that xij > ei as required. If J does include i’s “virtual resource??, then it is a
bottleneck. This means that agent i got everything available of that resource and therefore, by
construction of the utility function u′i, x
i
j=w
i
j(max(ui(~x))) for all j ∈ J (meaning, agent i got
all he asked for).
5.4 The Bottom Line
Looking at what we have constructed so far, we now have the tools to generalize [6].
Theorem 3. In every setup with perfectly complementary, continuous, and strictly monotonic
utility functions u1, ..., un there exists an allocation that satisfies “No Justified Complaints”.
Proof. If needed, we extend the uis to be non-satiable as shown in the previous section. Then
take a competitive equilibrium of the u′is, guaranteed to exist by Corollary 1, and then by
Theorem 2 the parsimonious bundles derived from that allocation are BBF for the u′is, and thus
by Lemma 7 also for the uis.
Theorem 4. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a “Bottleneck-Based Fair
allocation for every setup with Leontief or satiable Leontief utilities.
Proof. Codenotti and Varadarajan [3] introduces an algorithm based on convex programming
that finds a competitive equilibrium in a Fisher Market for Leontief utilities. In fact, the solution
to their convex program provides the relevant parsimonious bundles. For the case of satiable
Leontief utilities, the process of converting them to Leontief utilities described in the previous
section is algorithmically trivial. Thus, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a BBF
allocation in every setup with Leontief or satiable Leontief utilities.
6 Discussion
As computer systems become larger and more pervasive, servicing more and more agents, the
question of fair resource allocation becomes more relevant. The classic requirements of an
operating system’s scheduler will no longer do.
We have studied two notions of fairness: DRF [9] and BBF [6]. The fact that both used the
same family of utility function seems to indicate something about the nature of utility functions
in such systems. Therefore, we have extended it to a larger family of utility functions - which
may apply to other scenarios as well. The generalization of DRF to GRF stresses how vague
the concept of fairness is, as it requires a few independent decisions, none of which comes
with a strict sense of what is right and what is wrong. Establishing the connection between the
question of BBF and Fisher Market equilibrium shows that answers can sometimes be found
in unexpected places. It also implies that any solution to the market equilibrium problem for
continuous, strictly monotonic and perfectly complementary utilities automatically produces
a BBF allocation (for example, [8]). An important issue for further research is the question
of incentive. For example, [9] have shown that their algorithm for DRF is strategy proof and
envy-free. In addition, the polynomial-time algorithm suggested here for BBF may allow us to
prove or disprove the existence of similar properties for this fairness notion.
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